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Welfare Benefits, Minimum Wage
Rate and the Duration of Welfare
Spells: Evidence from a Natural
Experiment in Canada*
Bernard Fortin , Guy Lacroix† ‡
Résumé / Abstract
Dans cet article, nous étudions la relation entre le niveau des
prestations et la durée de séjour à la sécurité sociale. L’analyse repose sur une
approche dite d’expérience naturelle et consiste à comparer la durée de séjour
avant et après l’introduction de la réforme majeure qui a eu lieu en 1989 au
Québec. Un volet important de cette réforme consistait à éliminer l’écart de
prestations entre les individus et les couples sans enfants de moins de trente ans
et les bénéficiaires âgés de plus de trente ans. Les prestations des moins de trente
ans sont ainsi passées de 173 $ par mois ($ de 1986) à plus de 425 $ par mois,
soit une augmentation de 145 %. L’impact de ce changement est analysé à l’aide
d’un modèle de durée semi-paramétrique qui incorpore des variables exogènes
qui dépendent du temps, tels les prestations, le salaire minimum, le taux de
chômage, etc. Par ailleurs, une hausse du salaire minimum a pour effet
d’augmenter la durée de séjour à la sécurité sociale des individus âgés entre 18
et 24 ans, mais de diminuer la durée de séjour de ceux âgés entre 25 et 29 ans.
Enfin, nos résultats montrent que la réforme a eu pour effet d’augmenter la durée
de séjour d’environ 2 à 4,5 mois.
In this paper we analyze the impact of benefits on the length of
welfare spells. It introduces a “natural experiment” approach of comparing the
length of welfare spells before and after a major reform of the welfare program
that took place in Québec in August 1989. An important feature of this reform
was the abolishment of discrimination based on age that applied to single
individuals and childless couples below the age of thirty. With the reform, their
monthly benefits rose from $173 (in dollars of 1986) to $425, an increase of
over 145%. To analyze the impact of the reform, we utilize a semi-parametric
duration model with time-varying covariates such as welfare benefits, minimum
wage rate, unemployment rate, etc. We find that benefits have an important
impact on spell duration of individuals below thirty years of age. We also find
that the minimum wage rate has an adverse effect on the duration of individuals
in the 18-24 age group but a positive effect on those in the 25-29 age group.
Finally, our estimates suggest that the reform increased duration on welfare
from 2 to 4.5 months.
Mots Clés : Prestations de sécurité sociale, salaire minimum, modèle de
durée semi-paramétrique
Keywords : Welfare benefits, minimum wage, semi-parametric duration
model
JEL : I30, J64
1 Introduction
One of the most crucial issues concerning welfare reform is whether ben-
ets induce \dependency" in terms of frequency and duration of partic-
ipation. The existence of such dependency is likely to increase the costs
of welfare programs as well as to push some welfare claimants into a
poverty trap, thus encouraging the very dependency the programs seek
to alleviate.
Recently, Mott (1992) has surveyed a growing body of literature
that links welfare benets and welfare dependency. While this literature
has focused primarily on static welfare participation{that is, participa-
tion at a point in time{ more recent research eorts have focused on
dynamic welfare participation{ that is, entry and exit into welfare. The
latter studies have been mostly concerned with estimating the deter-
minants of the exit rates (hazard rates) from AFDC rolls. Although
they have generally found that the AFDC benets levels have a nega-
tive impact on exit rates, the evidence is rather weak [e.g., O'Neill et
al. (1987), Blank (1989), Ruggles (1989), Fitzgerald (1991), Giannarelli
(1992), Hoynes and MaCurdy (1994)].
As suggested by Fitzgerald (1989), small (and often non-signicant)
estimated eects can partly be explained by data deciencies. In most
studies, the identication of the benets eect rests essentially on cross-
states variability in benets levels and/or on within-state time variability
in real benets. One problem with cross-states variability is that dier-
ences in state benets levels (and implicit tax rates) may be partly oset
by dierences in other program characteristics such as the severity in the
administrative treatment of claims, the level of earnings disregard or the
assets test. They may also reect dierences in state cost of living, in
non-AFDC benets or in other regional variables that are dicult to con-
trol for. Furthermore, average real monthly benets across states have
shown fairly smooth changes over time, with moderate increases between
1968 and 1974, gradual declines between 1974 and 1982 and attening
after 1982 [see Hoynes and MaCurdy (1994)]. Therefore, studies that
rely on a relatively short time frame
1
may lack sucient within state
variability in the benets data, which may account for the small esti-
mated eects. Even when the time frame is suciently long
2
, changes
in real benets are likely to be correlated with other time-evolving vari-
1
For instance, Ruggles (1989), Fitzgerald (1991) and Giannarelli (1992) use the
rst panel of SIPP, which contains 32 months of data.
2
O'Neill et al. (1987) use the NLS Young Women's panel over an 11 year period.
1
ables that inuence welfare spell duration but that are hard to measure
adequately.
In Canada, only recently have studies appeared that analyze the ef-
fects of social assistance benets on dependency. Nearly all of them [e.g.,
Allen (1993), Charette and Meng (1994), Dooley (1994)] are based on a
static model of welfare participation and use annual survey data. They
all nd that the level of social assistance exerts a strong positive and sig-
nicant inuence on welfare participation of female heads of household.
However, to our knowledge, only two papers analyze the exit rates from
social assistance [Bailey (1994), Barrett (1995)]. Both are based on data
from the British Columbia Income Assistance Program. Neither of them
study the impact of the basic real assistance level on social assistance
spell duration.
3
In this paper, we analyze the impact of benets on the length of
welfare spells using information from a natural experiment that took
place in the Province of Quebec in August 1989. A major reform was
implemented that provided for the abolishment of discrimination dis-
crimination based on age that applied to the benets single individuals
and childless couples below the age of 30 were entitled to.
4
Thus, prior
to the reform, the basic benets able-bodied singles below the age of 30
(and childless couples) were entitled to amounted approximately to 40%
of those of individuals over 30 years of age. With the reform, monthly
benets were equalized and thus rose from $173 ($ 1986) to $425 for
those below 30 years of age, an increase of over 245%.
5
3
Bailey (1994) analyses the impact of the B.C. Enhanced Earnings Exemption
and nds that its eect on exit rates is inconclusive. Barrett (1995) focuses on the
shape of exit rates across various categories of households and tests for the presence
of state dependency. However, he does not introduce any program parameters in his
set of covariates.
4
Other features of the reform were the introduction of a new, more generous,
welfare program for the disabled and the replacement of the work income supplemen-
tation program (SUPRET) introduced in 1979 with a new one (APPORT), which is
better integrated to the income tax system and which provides higher supplemen-
tation rates, but limited to families with children. For details, see Ministere de la
Securite du revenu (1989). Since able-bodied single persons, who are the focus of our
analysis, are not directly aected by these aspects of the reform, we will ignore them
in what follows.
5
In fact, in the case of single individuals, the 1989 reform introduced four basic
benets schedules depending on a claimant's situation vis-a-vis employability pro-
grams: participant, non-participant (i.e. who refuses to participate), available or
not-available (due to a temporary illness, etc). Since the benets levels vary little
across these categories, and since only 10% of claimants on average participate in
these programs, we did not directly take these dierences into account in our anal-
ysis. However, the xed annual eects introduced in the model may control for this
2
Figure 1 below depicts the schedule of monthly benets singles of
both age groups were entitled to between January 1975 and December
1993. The step-wise shape arises because the benets are generally ad-
justed against ination once a year whereas we utilize the monthly CPI
(1986=100) to deate them.
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Figure 1
Monthly Welfare Benet (1986 $)
Age < 30
Age  30
The schedule shows that the real benets of both age groups have
remained relatively constant throughout the whole period. In August
1989 (month 176), the monthly benets are equalized at 453$. The real
benets eventually decline to about 420$ and remain constant thereafter.
Our estimation strategy consists in exploiting the time of entry into
welfare to identify the impact of benets on duration, and the fact that
only individuals below 30 years of age were subjected to such a dramatic
change. As such, they constitute our \experimental group", whereas
individuals over 30 years of age constitute our \control group".
To our knowledge, this paper provides the rst attempt to estimate
the impact of benets levels on welfare spell duration of single individuals
feature of the reform. The schedules used in our analysis is the one that applies for
those who are available for employability programs.
3
since, in U.S., the AFDC programs are limited to families. The empirical
analysis uses over 19 years of monthly data from the case records of the
Social Assistance administrative les. The les provide accurate data
on spell lengths and on many individual characteristics. Using a wide
time frame allows much variation in other policy parameters such as
the real minimum wage and in the overall level of economic activity.
The estimation strategy recognizes that the analysis of welfare spells
is sensitive to the choice of a functional form for the hazard of leaving
welfare [see, e.g., Blank, (1986 and 1989)]. It thus borrows from recent
work in which semi-parametric estimation techniques are used [Heckman
and Singer (1984), Meyer (1990), Han and Hausman (1990)].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
of welfare spell duration consistent with a hazard framework. It high-
lights most features of the program parameters and potential behavioral
response to these. Section 3 discusses the econometric strategy used to
estimate the model. Section 4 provides a description of the data and
discusses the empirical variables used in the model. Main ndings are
reported in section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 6.
2 The model
The model is assumed to be a standard discrete choice model in continu-
ous time (e.g., Olsen, Smith and Farkas (1986)). Consider an individual
on a welfare spell at period t. This program is dened by a guaranteed
income benet of g
t
per unit of time and a tax-back rate of 100% on
his total wage earnings (w
t
h
t
), where w
t
is the individual's wage rate at
t and h
t
is his hours of work at t, and on his private non-wage income
(y
t
).
6
Note that y
t
includes returns from net assets. The individual also
receives an exogenous benet a
t
(e.g., a refundable sales tax credit) from
other income security programs.
Under the assumption that g
t
> y
t
, the individual's non-convex bud-
get constraint at t is illustrated by BCE in Figure 2.The individual is a
welfare claimant as long as his private earnings are less than the break
even income (g
t
) for the program, that is w
t
h
t
+ y
t
< g
t
. This situation
corresponds to the segment BC. The slope of this segment, which reects
the individual's net wage rate, is zero since the tax-back rate on wage
6
The relevant tax-back rate for singles on social assistance in Quebec is 100%
above a very small earnings exemption.
4
earnings is 100%. If w
t
h
t
+ y
t
 g
t
, the individual is no longer eligible
for welfare and his marginal wage rate is w (see segment CE).
Income
Labor

t
u
t
g
t
+ a
t
y
t
+ a
t
0
A
B
C
D
E
!
t
Figure 2
Conditional upon receiving new information at time t, his decision to
pursue or not his spell on welfare depends on a comparison between his
utility at t if he enters the labour market and his utility on the welfare
program.
7
The formulation of the hazard associated with this model
rst requires the derivation of the utility attached to each alternative.
7
Given the 100% tax-back rate, the individual has no incentives to work in the
ocial market while receiving welfare benets, i.e., he will prefer the point B on
Figure 2 In our sample, approximately 5% of the welfare recipients report labour
income. One explanation is the presence of the small earnings exemption in the
welfare system.
5
Under the assumption that the individual is myopic and chooses his
hours of work and consumption to maximize his utility at each period t,
his indirect utility at t, conditional upon his choice to enter the labour
market, is an increasing function of his wage rate w
t
and of his exoge-
nous non-welfare income, y
t
+a
t
. Note that, in our sample, the individual
wage rate is unobservable. However, it is assumed to depend on a vector
of individual characteristics, s
t
(e.g., education, region, sex, age), and on
the current spell duration (due to the depreciation of human capital or
the eect of negative signals sent to potential employers: w
t
= w(s
t
; t)).
The latter eect can thus introduce some duration dependence into the
model. The conditional indirect utility also depends on a vector of vari-
ables reecting the economic environment, m
t
, on the current duration
of his spell, t, and on a random term 
l
t
. The direct eect of the vari-
able t reects the possibility that the spell length aects the individual's
preferences (another reason for the presence of duration dependence).
The random term 
L
t
reects the arrival of new information aecting the
individual's utility in the labour market. 
L
t
is unknown to the econome-
trician but is assumed to be observed by the individual before he takes
his decision at t. Substituting the wage rate by its function w(s
t
; t) into
the conditional indirect utility and assuming that 
L
t
enters linearly the
utility function, the latter is therefore given by:
v
t
= v(y
t
+ a
t
; x
t
; t) + 
L
t
; (1)
where x
t
= (s
t
;m
t
);
with v
y
t
> 0; v
a
t
> 0:
Point D in Figure 2 represents the individual's choice, conditional upon
entering the labour market at t.
On the other hand, the individual's (direct) utility function, condi-
tional upon pursuing his spell on welfare at t, depends on his consump-
tion level on welfare (g
t
+ a
t
), on his hours of work (=0), on the vector
x
t
of control variables, on the current spell duration t, and on a random
term (
W
t
) reecting the arrival of information aecting (linearly) his
utility on welfare. The individual's utility function on welfare is thus:
u
t
= u(g
t
+ a
t
; 0; x
t
; t) + 
W
t
; (2)
with u
g
t
> 0; u
a
t
> 0:
6
Point B in Figure 2 illustrates the individual's choice at t, conditional
upon being on welfare.
The decision process is assumed to take the following form. New
values of the error terms (the 's) arrive at random intervals. When this
new information arrives, the preferred alternative is chosen.
8
Following
Olsen, Smith and Farkas (1986), we assume that the arrival of new infor-
mation follows a Poisson process with constant rate .
9
Assuming that
the error terms are temporally independent and using eqs. (1) and (2),
the instantaneous rate of exit from welfare at t, given that the duration
has lasted until t, is given by:
(y
t
; a
t
; g
t
; x
t
; t) =  [Prob (v(y
t
+a
t
; x
t
; t)+
L
t
 u(g
t
+a
t
; 0; x
t
; t)+
W
t
]:
(3)
Eq. (3) yields the hazard function of the model. Dene 
t
as 
W
t
 
L
t
.

t
is a white noise with a distribution function given by F (
t
). Dene
also 
c
t
as the dierence between the non stochastic components of the
utility level on the labour market v() and on welfare u(). One has:

c
t
= 
c
(y
t
; a
t
; g
t
; x
t
; t) with 
c
y
t
> 0, 
c
a
t
< 0 (assuming that leisure is a
normal good) and 
c
g
t
< 0. Therefore, (3) becomes
(z
t
; t) = Prob [
t
 
c
(z
t
; t)] = F [
c
(z
t
; t)] (4)
where z
t
= (y
t
; a
t
; g
t
; x
t
) and
with 
y
t
> 0; 
a
t
; 
g
t
< 0:
Hence, the level of private non-wage income (y
t
) has a positive eect on
the rate of exit from welfare, since it is 100% taxed on welfare while it is
not taxed at all when the individual is on the labour market. Moreover an
increase in the exogenous benets from other income security programs
(a
t
) reduces the exit rate from welfare as long as leisure is a normal
good. Finally, an increase in the level of welfare benets (g
t
) has also a
negative eect on the hazard rate of leaving welfare.
8
For simplicity, we ignore the possibility that the exogenous variables might change
between successive arrivals of the 's which would result in the choice of returning to
the labor market [see Heckman and Singer (1984)].
9
It is easy to generalize the model to the case where  depends on a vector of
exogenous variables.
7
Our model can be generalized for more realism. First, rationing in
the labour market can be simply introduced by assuming that h
t
 h
t
,
where h
t
is the maximum hours that can be worked by the individual at
t. Under the assumption that this constraint is binding, the individual's
utility level, conditional upon entering the labour market, is now given by
the constrained direct utility function: v
t
= u(w
t
h
t
+ y
t
; h
t
; x
t
; t) + 
L
t
.
Replacing the conditional indirect utility function v() + 
L
t
with this
constrained direct utility function in eq. (3), it is easy to show that 
h
t
>
0, that is, a decrease in labour market rationing raises the individual's
rate of exit from welfare.
Second, it is likely that the generosity of the unemployment insurance
(UI) program inuences the exit rate from welfare. First, receiving UI
benets can make the individual ineligible for welfare, as long as his
private income and UI benets exceed the break-even income of the
welfare program. Second, UI benets can entice the individual to leave
welfare and to enter the labour market, given the expectations of future
UI benets if he becomes unemployed. In the empirical section, a UI
eligibility parameter, dened as the ratio between the minimum number
of working weeks required to get eligible for UI and the maximum number
of weeks of UI eligibility, is included as an explanatory variable.
10
3 Estimation Strategy
The aim of this section is to discuss the approach we adopt to estimate
the hazard function (4). As in Meyer (1990), the hazard is assumed to
take the following form
11
:
(z
t
; t) = 
0
(t) exp(z
0
t
); (5)
where 
0
(t) is the baseline hazard (i.e., the hazard when z
t
= 0) and 
is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
It has been argued that using a non parametric form in estimating
the part of the hazard common to all individuals (the baseline hazard)
is more adequate than imposing a parametric form for three reasons.
10
There was not enough variability in the UI wage replacement ratio over the
sample period to include this variable in the model.
11
This approach is widely used in labor economics (e.g., Belzil (1993). It is based on
the idea that individual hazard functions dier across individuals up to a proportional
factor.
8
First, specic forms of the baseline hazard (e.g., Weibull) lack theoret-
ical support. Second, in many circumstances, the shape of the baseline
hazard is irregular and unlikely to be well approximated by a simple
parametric form.
12
. Third it can be shown that misspecication of the
baseline hazard yields inconsistent estimate of .
For empirical purposes, it may be useful to generalize equation (5)
to consider unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. It is well
know that if unaccounted for, the overall hazard can exhibit spurious
negative duration dependence. Therefore, equation (5) can be rewritten
to account for , a random variable reecting the individual's unobserved
characteristics. Assuming that heterogeneity takes a multiplicative form,
the resulting mixed proportional hazard model is given by:
(z
t
; t; ) =  exp(z
0
t
)
0
(t) (6)
A convenient and commonly used distribution for  is the gamma dis-
tribution
13
with mean normalized to one and variance 
2
. Under this
assumption and given observations of failure times over the discrete pe-
riods t = t
0
; t
1
; t
2
; : : : ; t
T 1
for individuals i = 1; : : : ; N , Meyer (1986)
has shown that the resulting log-likelihood is given by:
L(; ; 
2
) =
N
X
i=1
log
8
>
<
>
:
2
4
1 + 
2

k
i
 1
X
j=0
expf
t
j
+ z
0
it
j
g
3
5
 
 2
 
i
2
4
1 + 
2

k
i
X
j=0
expf
t
j
+ z
0
it
j
g
3
5
 
 2
9
>
=
>
;
: (7)
where 
t
j
= ln(
R
t
j+1
t
j

0
(v)dv);  = [
t
0
; 
t
1
; : : : ; 
t
T 1
], z
it
j
is a vector
of time dependent explanatory variables for individual i, 
i
= 1 if the
duration for individual i is not (right) censored, = 0 otherwise and t
k
i
is the observed (censored or not) duration of individual i's spell on SA.
12
For instance, Meyer (1990) mentions that U.S. studies of unemployment durations
have found irregular spikes in the hazard at about 24 and 36 weeks.
13
Other distributions could be used; in particular, the heterogeneity distribution
could be non-parametric. However, as conjectured by Meyer (1990), if the baseline
hazard takes a exible form, the choice of the heterogeneity distribution may be
unimportant.
9
This specication has been used by many authors recently to study un-
employment spells, job tenure, etc. Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995),
Arulampalam and Stewart (1995), Anderson (1992)].
4 Data
The basic sample we use is taken from the monthly case records of the
social assistance program in the Province of Quebec. The administrative
les contain detailed information on individual characteristics. It is thus
possible to identify those who are permanently handicapped or seriously
ill. These individuals are excluded from the sample to avoid sampling
individuals whose risk of exit is practically zero. The sample consists of
95 514 healthy or lightly impaired individuals drawn randomly from the
population with a social assistance (SA) history between January 1979
and December 1993. The drawing is performed on the basis of the social
insurance number and is thus not related to the frequency or the length
of individual episodes. In all, these 95 514 individuals experimented 180
659 spells of welfare over the sample period, or 1.89 spell on average per
individual.
To avoid left censoring, individuals who were in the midst of a spell
in January 1979 were followed back as early as January 1975. Spells
that were uninterrupted between January 1975 and January 1979 were
considered left censored and removed from the sample. Hence, spells
may have started as early as February 1975 and as late as December
1993. Such a wide window allows considerable variation in program pa-
rameters and labor market conditions, a necessary condition to identify
the contribution of each to exit probabilities. A spell of SA is dened as
a sequence of consecutive months of SA receipt. An exit occurs when an
individual is one month not in receipt of SA benets. Right censoring
occurs if a spell was ongoing in December 1993.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Single individuals, which are the focus of this paper, constitute the
largest group of welfare claimants. They represent approximately 60%
of all household in our sample and 48% of total spells. As Many as 4
732 individuals got married or had a child following entry into welfare.
Spells during which the \single" status changed were removed from the
10
analysis.
14
As well, age (in month) at the start of the spell determines
the age group to which the individual belongs.
Prima facie evidence on the impact of the 1989 reform is provided
by an examination of the empirical exit rates before and after its imple-
mentation. Figures 3a{3f
15
plots Kaplan-Meier estimates of exit rates
for men and women separately and for three dierent age groups over a
period of 5 years. For each age group the gure plots the exit rates for
all the episodes that occurred before 1989 and for those that occurred
in 1989 or after.
16
The exit rates are computed over 6 month intervals.
Recall that only individuals below the age of 30 have been aected by
the reform. Figure 3a{3c clearly show that the exit rates of women in
the 18{24 and 25{29 age groups have decreased signicantly after 1989.
In the rst semester following the reform, the exit rates declined from
37.6% to 29.2% and from 33.6% to 30.6%, respectively. On the other
hand, women in the 30{45 age group show no decrease in exit rates. If
anything, exit rates increase slightly after 1989.
Figures 3d{3f plot men's exit rates. In general, the decline in exit
rates following the reform is more pronounced for men. For those in
the 18{24 age group, the exit rate for the rst 6 months decreased from
45.6% to 33.8%. It decreased almost as much for men in the 25{29 age
group (43.8% ! 35.3 %). Notice that the exit rates decreased slightly
for men in the 30{45 age group in the rst 2 semesters but show little
dierence thereafter.
Naturally, the decrease in exit rates after 1989 can not be attributed
to the reform alone. The deteriorating labour market that accompa-
nied the economic downturn of 1991 may have hurt younger individuals
more. The unemployment rate rose steadily between January 1990 De-
cember 1993. It is quite likely that the incidence of unemployment is
not distributed uniformly across age groups or gender. Finally, while
benets more than doubled in 1989, the minimum wage was at its low-
est level over the past 20 years. Indeed, the nominal minimum wage
remained constant from October 1981 until September 1986. Figure 4
below depicts the monthly real minimum wage rate from January 1975
to December 1993.
14
We also treated these spells as censored and included them in the analysis. The
econometric results were robust to their inclusion.
15
In appendix.
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Episodes that started before 1989 and are still ongoing in 1989 are treated as
censored.
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Monthly Minimum Wage (1986 $)
The gure clearly shows that the minimum wage rate decreased markedly
between April 1978 (month 40) and August 1985 (month 140). Over the
whole period the average minimum wage rate was approximately $4.84
(1986 $). It peaked at $6.00 between in 1976{1977, and bottomed at $
3.97 in August 1985.
Rising unemployment rates, increased benets and low minimum
wage rates can all be conducive to lower exit rates. Other factors may
also be responsible for the sharp decline in exit rates in the post{1989
period. Indeed only 30% of the total caseload were able-bodied individ-
uals in 1975 and this proportion was 81% in 1993. The characteristics of
able-bodied individuals have remained relatively constant until 1989. In
the following years, the average level of education of male beneciaries
under 30 years of age decreased nearly 1 year while that of women re-
mained remarkably constant. The proportion of individuals born outside
Canada rose from 1% to nearly 10% during the same period. Finally, the
proportion of individuals living in the City of Montreal also increased
considerably. This is partly due to the fact that the majority of ben-
eciaries born outside Canada who elect to migrate to Quebec tend to
locate in Montreal.
Table 1 presents sample descriptive statistics. As shown, women of
all age groups experience on average longer spells than men of the same
12
group. The mean duration of spells also increases with age. Men and
women between 18 and 24 years of age account for more than 52% of all
beneciaries in the sample period but experience relatively short spells.
The next panel presents descriptive statistics on variables that are
constant throughout spells.
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The individuals in our sample are generally
poorly educated. The average schooling is somewhat less than high-
school (12 years in Quebec). This is true of all age groups. Note that
women are on average slightly better educated than men, which is also
true of the total population in general. Finally, the table indicates the
proportion of individuals living in the City of Montreal (excluding its
suburbs). The city represents approximately 15% of the total provincial
population. Beneciaries over 25 years of age are overrepresented in
Montreal. This probably reects the fact the Montreal has the lowest
per capita income of all large cities in Canada.
The last panel concerns variables which vary over spells. Unlike ed-
ucation, the average age at the start of a spell is remarkably constant
through time for all groups, even following the reform of 1989. The
monthly welfare benets are computed from program parameters. The
large standard error for individuals under 30 years of age is primarily due
to the reform of 1989. Note that in real terms, the benets of individuals
over 30 years of age vary little. The monthly unemployment rate of adult
men was chosen over other denitions since it probably best represents
the true labor market tightness of strongly attached individuals. Much
of the variation in the minimum wage is due to the fact that it remained
constant in nominal terms for nearly 5 years at a time when ination
varied considerably. Finally, the eligibility conditions (generosity vari-
able) of the unemployment insurance program is measured as the ratio
between the number of weeks of entitlement and the minimal number of
weeks of work necessary to get eligible for benets. These two parame-
ters depend on the regional unemployment rates. To avoid simultaneity
bias, the generosity is computed at the overall mean unemployment rate
over the sample period for each region separately.
5 Results
In order to implement the approach described in section 3, ongoing
lengthy spells must be censored. Given that our data span over 19 years
17
Note that few individuals move between regions. For those who do, the region
where they spent most time during their spell is retained as region of residence.
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of monthly SA receipt, we censor all observations lasting more than 40
months. For the samples of men, spells lasting more than 40 months
account for between .8% and 4.1% of total spells, while for women they
account for 2.3% to 14.3% of all spells. Despite the large sample sizes,
some spell lengths have few observations. Furthermore, to keep the num-
ber of estimated parameters within reasonable range, it was decided to
split the spell lengths within 21 intervals. Each interval corresponds to
a given element of . These intervals are (months): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15{16, 17{18, 19{21, 22{25, 26{31, 32{39, 40+
The time-varying variables must be computed for each interval follow-
ing the month of entry into the social assistance program. For intervals
that last more than one month, the variables are averaged out over the
interval. Hence, benets, minimum wage, unemployment rate and UI
generosity variables are computed in this fashion. Individuals who turn
30 in the midst of a spell are imputed the appropriate benet. If this
happens in an interval that is greater than one month, they are imputed
a weighted average of benets for that interval. Finally, we created 3
vectors of dummy variables to control for potential seasonnality in the
exit rates. Each vector consists of a sequence of 1's and 0's where the
1's represent the months of the relevant quarter. The omitted quarter is
January{March. Finally, note that we did not include the private non-
wage income variable (the variable y in the theoretical model), since the
level of assets is likely to be an endogenous variable while our estimating
model is a reduced-form one. Moreover, we could not estimate the im-
pact of the non-welfare benets (the variable a
t
) due to lack of variability
in this variable over the sample period.
The estimation results for women and men are reported in Tables 2
and 3, respectively.
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Separate estimations were conducted for the three
age groups since it is usually believed that the behavioral response to
program and policy parameters varies with age.
18
We managed to estimate the model with unobserved heterogeneity only with
sample of men between 25 and 29 years of age. Other samples always converged
to 
2
= 0. This problem has been encountered in many studies that used the same
econometric specication [Han and Hausman (1990), Anderson (1992), Arulampalam
and Stewart (1995), Meyer (1990)]. Furthermore, Monte Carlo experiments by Ridder
and Verbakel (1983) have shown that a zero estimated variance is frequently found,
even when the estimated and the true models are identical! Our estimations with
heterogeneity always converged to the same values as those without heterogeneity.
Note there exists ample evidence that omission or misspecication of the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution has almost no consequences on the estimated covariates
parameters in the case of a exible baseline specication (see e.g., Dolton and van
der Klaauw (1995) and Meyer (1990)).
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Results for the samples of women
Table 2 shows that an additional year of education has a signicant
impact on exit rates of the three age groups. It also shows that the im-
pact decreases rapidly with age. Hence, an additional year of education
decreases the exit rates of women in the 18-24 years group by as much
as 18%, but only by 1.5% for women in the 30{45 years group. Being
native from Canada increases the exit rate of women in the 25{29 years
group by 12%. Age has a negative and statistically signicant impact
on the exit rates of all women. In particular, younger women's exit rate
decreases very rapidly with age. Note that age is measured in months.
Thus, aging an additional year translates into a 25% decrease in exit
rate in their case. For other women, an additional year translates into a
5.3% and 6.9% decrease, respectively.
The next three lines concern the seasonnality eects. The parameter
estimates clearly indicate that the exit rates from welfare are highly
seasonal. Not surprisingly, the quarter ranging from July to September
witnesses the highest exit rates. For younger women, the exit rates
increases by as much as 42% in that quarter.
Finally, the last part of the upper panel concerns policy variables.
Welfare benets, not surprisingly, have a negative impact on the exit
rates but are only statistically signicant for younger women. Inter-
estingly, the minimum wage has a dierentiated eect on each group.
Younger women, on one hand, are adversely aected by increases in the
minimum wage. On the other hand, women in the 25{29 years group
are positively aected by increases in the minimum wage. Presumably,
employers faced with an increased minimum wage prefer older workers.
Finally, women in the 30{45 years group are not aected by changes in
the minimum wage.
The unemployment rate has a strong negative eect on the hazard
rate of women below the age of 30. In a static framework, increasing
unemployment can be interpreted as labour market rationing, i.e. in-
dividuals may be constrained to work less hours of work than desired
(part-time instead of full-time).
19
As was shown in section 2, increased
rationing leads to a lower exit rate. The parameter estimate associated
with the unemployment rate is consistent with both these interpreta-
tions. Finally, the generosity of the UI program has a negative and
19
In a search framework, increasing unemployment is akin to a lower rate of job
oers arrival. Hence, the probability of receiving an \acceptable" oer decreases,
thereby lowering the exit rate.
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statistically signicant impact on the exit rate of older women. This re-
sult is rather surprising. It may be that increases in the generosity of the
UI program attracts individuals with a low labour market attachment
into work (married women in the 30{45 age group). Welfare beneciaries
may thus have to compete with these new workers for work.
The lower panel of the table displays the estimated average monthly
baseline exit rates along with their asymptotic standard errors. It can be
shown from our econometric specication that the probability of leaving
SA at time T + 1 given an individual with mean characteristics z
t
was
on SA at time T is Prob[T
i
  +1jT
i
  ] = 1  exp[  exp(z
0
t
^
 + 
t
j
 
log(t
j+1
  t
j
))]: The rst expression between parentheses is the sample
average of all exogenous variables (time-varying and non time-varying),
and the last expression simply accounts for the fact that intervals are
not all of the same length. From inspection of the table it is readily
seen that women from the three age groups exhibit dierent patterns
of exit rates. In three groups, the hazard rates are increasing in the
rst few months. Women in the 18{24 and 30{45 age groups have very
constant exit rates thereafter. Women in the 25{29 age group display
some duration dependence as their exit rates decrease rapidly after the
rst 5{6 months on welfare.
Results for the samples of men
Qualitatively, the results for men are very similar to those of women.
For instance, an additional year of education has a positive impact on
the exit rate, but to a lesser extent than for women. On the other hand,
aging an additional year has less impact on the exit rates of men (11.6%
for the youngest and 7.32% for the oldest). As for women, most regional
dummy variables are negative for those in the 18{24 years group and are
mostly positive for those in the 30{45 years group. Exit rates of men
are also characterised by seasonal eects but on the whole, they exhibit
greater seasonnality than those of women.
Welfare benets have a negative impact on men in the 18{24 and 25{
29 age groups. As for women, the minimum wage has a dierentiated
impact across age groups. The younger men are adversely aected by an
increase in the minimum wage whereas older men are positively aected.
The unemployment rate has a negative impact on all age groups but in
particular for those aged between 25 and 29. Finally, the generosity of
the UI system has a negative impact on the exit rates of younger men,
which is a rather surprising result.
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Finally, inspection of the lower panel reveals that the men of the
three age groups do not display much duration dependence. Only those
in the 25{29 age group have show a decrease in the exit rates following
approximately a year on welfare.
20
Elasticities of expected duration
The estimated baseline exit rates can be converted into expected du-
ration [see Katz and Meyer (1990) for details]. Elasticities of expected
duration can be estimated by increasing marginally any exogenous vari-
able and computing the ratio of the percent change in expected duration
and in the exogenous variable. Table 4 reports such elasticities with re-
spect to a number of exogenous variables for each group along with their
standard error.
21
First, the estimated elasticity of the expected dura-
tion with respect to the benets level is around 0.20 for both men and
women of the 18-24 age group. Given that their mean duration is 11.38
and 13.23, respectively, the reform of 1989 is estimated to have increased
their mean duration by 2.27 and 2.34 months, respectively.
22
The only
other statistically signicant elasticity is that of men between 25 and
29 years of age. Given that their mean duration is approximately 16.9
months, the reform is estimated to have increased their mean duration
by 4.7 months.
The next column reports the elasticities with respect to the mini-
mum wage. As shown, a 1% increase in the minimum wage increases
signicantly the duration of spells of men and women in the 18{24 age
group, but also signicantly reduces the duration of those in the 25{29
age group. Interestingly, men and women in the last age group are not
aected by changes in the minimum wage. Our estimates thus suggests
that only the very young are aected by a change in the minimum wage
and that its impact diers considerably across age. The next column
pertains to the unemployment rate. Not surprisingly, any increase in
the unemployment rate adversely aects duration, but men of all age
groups are aected whereas only women below 25 years are. This sug-
gests that older women are less constrained into welfare that younger
20
The computation of exit rates of men in the 25{29 age group account for the
unobserved heterogeneity. Since the variance of the Gamma distribution is very small,
there are practically no dierences with exit rates computed from a specication that
does not account for unobserved heterogeneity.
21
The standard errors are computed numerically using the Delta method.
22
This is a rough approximation. It is computed as E(t)(log(425)  log(172)),
where the gures in parentheses are the monthly benets after and before the reform
of August 1989.
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women.
Finally, the last column reports the elasticities with respect to school-
ing. As shown, an additional year of schooling considerably reduces
mean duration. The sensitivity of duration decreases with age and is
systematically greater for women. This results provides support for the
widespread idea in Quebec that school attendance among the youths
should be mandatory to qualify for benets.
6 Conclusion
In this paper the distribution of social assistance (SA) spells duration
in Quebec was described and analyzed. Using a sample of case records
over the period 1979{1993, we focused on single individuals since they
constitute by far the largest group of SA claimants and because they
have been the object of a major reform that more than doubled their
benets in August 1989. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that
addresses the issue of duration dependence on welfare using such large
and detailed data. Previous papers dealt mainly with annual data or
monthly data collected over a narrow period.
The theoretical model that we developed allowed us to sign most
of the variables that enter the determination of exit rates out of SA.
The econometric framework we used is exible in the sense that it does
not impose any particular constraint on the baseline hazard rate. In
the empirical analysis, we introduced a number of covariates to capture
some features of the UI program as well as a number of policy variables
such as minimum wage and benets level.
According to the parameter estimates, the major reform that was
enacted in 1989 resulted in increasing mean spell duration between 2{
5 months. There also appear to be little duration dependence in the
date: most exit rate proles are relatively at even for long durations.
Furthermore, our results show that the minimum wage has a negative
impact on the exit rates of the youngest but a positive one on individuals
between 25{29 years of age. Finally, our results strongly indicate that
increased education can have a dramatic impact on mean duration into
welfare.
18
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Table 1
y
Sample Statistics
Variable Women Men
z }| { z }| {
Age group: 18{24 25{29 30{45 18{24 25{29 30{45
Spell length
1
(months) 14.68 25.28 35.93 11.21 15.06 23.30
Censored
2
0.09 0.16 0.19 0.09 0.14 0.19
Obervations 17 319 5 146 5 350 26 042 12 469 17 066
A. Variables that are constant over spell:
Years of education 10.93 11.46 11.16 10.35 10.84 10.53
(2.19) (3.04) (3.49) (2.16) (2.82) (3.39)
Born in Canada 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.94 0.89 0.85
(0.21) (0.28) (0.31) (0.22) (0.31) (0.34)
City of Montreal 0.13 0.24 0.31 0.17 0.26 0.32
B. Variables wich vary over spell:
Age at start of spell 20.86 26.72 36.53 21.12 26.81 36.13
(1.73) (1.40) (4.07) (1.79) (1.40) (3.97)
| {z } | {z }
Monthly welfare benets
3
225.23 449.65 225.23 449.65
(107.99) (12.85) (107.99) (12.85)
Unemployment Rate
4
8.63
(2.46)
Minimum wage 4.84
(0.72)
U.I. Generosity 3.67
(0.88)
y
Figures in 1986 dollars.
1
Computed from Kaplan-Meir exit rates.
2
Censoring date is December 1993.
3
Computed from program parameters for the sample period.
4
Men 25-64 years of age.
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Table 2
Hasard Model Estimation { Women
y
Variable 18 { 24 25 { 29 30 { 45
Individual characteristics
Schooling 0.1818

(0.0053) 0.1139

(0.0062) 0.0151

(0.0050)
Born in Canada -0.0569 (0.0439) 0.1261

(0.0650) 0.0903 (0.0569)
Age -0.0214

(0.0005) -0.0044

(0.0010) -0.0058

(0.0003)
Seasonnal Eects
April{June 0.2218

(0.0236) 0.0574 (0.0462) 0.0677 0.0458
July{Septembre 0.4236

(0.0220) 0.1996

(0.0437) 0.1407

0.0445
Octobre{Decembre 0.1830

(0.0245) -0.0805

(0.0481) 0.0971

0.0482
Policy Variables
Welfare Benets -0.0008

(0.0003) -0.0004 (0.0005) -0.0015 (0.0021)
Minimum Wage -0.1652

(0.0291) 0.6581

(0.1410) -0.0940 (0.1457)
Unemployment Rate -0.0849

(0.0094) -0.0259 (0.0195) 0.0107 (0.0172)
U.I. Generosity -0.0493 (0.0402) -0.0232 (0.0766) -0.2616

(0.1218)
 - - - - - -
Average Monthly Baseline Exit Rates
Months Hazard Std. Hazard Std. Hazard Std.
rate error rate error rate error
1 0.0552 (0.0042) 0.0597 (0.0100) 0.0674 (0.0034)
2 0.0802 (0.0059) 0.0726 (0.0118) 0.0803 (0.0039)
3 0.0940 (0.0068) 0.0765 (0.0128) 0.0834 (0.0047)
4 0.0965 (0.0070) 0.0868 (0.0150) 0.0782 (0.0054)
5 0.1001 (0.0073) 0.0695 (0.0121) 0.0806 (0.0063)
6 0.0988 (0.0073) 0.0681 (0.0121) 0.0804 (0.0074)
7 0.0969 (0.0073) 0.0618 (0.0111) 0.0725 (0.0076)
8 0.0937 (0.0071) 0.0535 (0.0102) 0.0743 (0.0086)
9 0.0936 (0.0073) 0.0523 (0.0099) 0.0676 (0.0086)
10 0.0941 (0.0074) 0.0524 (0.0094) 0.0675 (0.0093)
11 0.0986 (0.0078) 0.0481 (0.0085) 0.0681 (0.0101)
12 0.1077 (0.0085) 0.0507 (0.0091) 0.0741 (0.0117)
13 0.0982 (0.0081) 0.0454 (0.0086) 0.0597 (0.0108)
14 0.0902 (0.0078) 0.0314 (0.0063) 0.0701 (0.0131)
15{16 0.0972 (0.0076) 0.0330 (0.0054) 0.0597 (0.0116)
17{18 0.0924 (0.0075) 0.0294 (0.0052) 0.0544 (0.0117)
19{21 0.0954 (0.0077) 0.0253 (0.0042) 0.0433 (0.0100)
22{25 0.1045 (0.0083) 0.0214 (0.0049) 0.0572 (0.0145)
26{31 0.1078 (0.0089) 0.0179 (0.0052) 0.0454 (0.0137)
32{39 0.1344 (0.0116) 0.0131 (0.0051) 0.0433 (0.0156)
Observations 17319 5146 5350
y
Standard errors in parentheses. The specication also includes 18 year dummies and 12
region dummies..

Statistically signicant at 5%.

Statistically signicant at 10%.
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Table 3
Hasard Model Estimation { Men
y
Variable 18 { 24 25 { 29 30 { 45
Individual Characteristics
Schooling 0.0976

(0.0465) 0.0048

(0.0051) 0.0041 (0.0028)
Born in Canada -0.0065 (0.0349) 0.0774

(0.0439) -0.0093 (0.0297)
Age -0.0097

(0.0003) -0.0058 (0.0066) -0.0061

(0.0002)
Seasonnal Eects
April{June 0.3500

(0.0190) 0.2098

(0.0280) 0.1508

(0.0252)
July{Septembre 0.5230

(0.0183) 0.3542

(0.0272) 0.2901

(0.0243)
Octobre{Decembre 0.2084

(0.0203) -0.0543

(0.0301 0.1296

(0.0270)
Policy Variables
Welfare Benets -0.0009

(0.0002) -0.0011

(0.0003) -0.0015 (0.0011)
Minimum Wage -0.1123

(0.0597) 0.3113

(0.0918) 0.1523

(0.0796)
Unemployment Rate -0.0603

(0.0080) -0.0679

(0.0123) -0.0707

(0.0090)
U.I. Generosity -0.1744

(0.0358) -0.0029 (0.5103) 0.0318 (0.0597)
 - - 0.1749

(0.0437) - -
Average Monthly Baseline Exit Rates
Months Hazard Std. Hazard Std. Hazard Std.
rate error rate error rate error
1 0.0712 (0.0043) 0.0831 (0.0088) 0.0612 (0.0018)
2 0.1114 (0.0065) 0.1089 (0.0119) 0.0744 (0.0022)
3 0.1292 (0.0074) 0.1415 (0.0165) 0.0831 (0.0026)
4 0.1538 (0.0087) 0.1428 (0.0183) 0.0840 (0.0030)
5 0.1347 (0.0079) 0.1493 (0.0203) 0.0790 (0.0034)
6 0.1375 (0.0081) 0.1287 (0.0187) 0.0798 (0.0039)
7 0.1336 (0.0080) 0.1175 (0.0176) 0.0751 (0.0041)
8 0.1322 (0.0081) 0.1334 (0.0199) 0.0719 (0.0044)
9 0.1293 (0.0080) 0.1262 (0.0187) 0.0738 (0.0049)
10 0.1346 (0.0085) 0.1168 (0.0169) 0.0682 (0.0050)
11 0.1247 (0.0081) 0.1028 (0.0154) 0.0699 (0.0055)
12 0.1251 (0.0084) 0.1252 (0.0190) 0.0699 (0.0060)
13 0.1329 (0.0090) 0.1268 (0.0208) 0.0726 (0.0068)
14 0.1067 (0.0078) 0.0980 (0.0177) 0.0562 (0.0060)
15{16 0.1074 (0.0073) 0.0744 (0.0134) 0.0554 (0.0059)
17{18 0.1095 (0.0077) 0.0784 (0.0153) 0.0544 (0.0066)
19{21 0.1055 (0.0075) 0.0814 (0.0152) 0.0580 (0.0076)
22{25 0.1108 (0.0077) 0.0716 (0.0156) 0.0532 (0.0078)
26{31 0.0985 (0.0075) 0.0599 (0.0144) 0.0435 (0.0077)
32{39 0.1052 (0.0086) 0.0568 (0.0174) 0.0424 (0.0089)
Observations 26042 12469 17066
y
Standard errors in parentheses. The specication also includes 18 year dummies and 12
region dummies.

Statistically signicant at 5%.

Statistically signicant at 10%.
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Table 4
Elasticities of Expected Duration
y
Variable
Benets Minimum Unemp. Schooling
wage rate
Women
18{24 0.1910

0.7866

1.0349

-2.0945

(0.0732) (0.3494) (0.1163) (0.0589)
25{29 0.1309 -3.2887

0.3374 -1.4610

(0.1469) (0.7094) (0.2562) (0.0819)
30{45 0.7661 0.4533 -0.1372 -0.1857

(1.0372) (0.7006) (0.2210) (0.0637)
Men
18{24 0.2281

0.5501

0.7643

-1.0964

(0.0622) (0.2913) (0.1019) (0.0445)
25{29 0.3075

-1.5661

0.8635

-0.5603

(0.1056) (0.4443) (0.1611) (0.0528)
30{45 0.7765 -0.7647 0.9485

-0.0495
(0.5981) (0.3998) (0.1220) (0.0345)
y
The elasticities are evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables.

Statistically signicant at 5%.

Statistically signicant at 10%.
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